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Passive decoy-state quantum key distribution for the weak coherent photon source with intensity
fluctuations
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Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology Institute, Zhengzhou 450004, China
Passive decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, proven to be more desirable than active ones in
some scenarios, also have the problem of device imperfections like intensity fluctuations. In this paper, the for-
mula of key generation rate of the passive decoy-state protocol using transformed weak coherent pulse (WCP)
source with intensity fluctuation is given, and then the influence of intensity fluctuations on the performance of
passive decoy-state protocol is rigorously characterized. From numerical simulations, it can be seen that inten-
sity fluctuations have non-negligible influence on the performance of the passive decoy-state QKD protocol with
WCP source. Most importantly, our simulations show that, under the same deviation of intensity fluctuations,
the passive decoy-state method performs better than the active two-intensity decoy-state method and is close to
the active three-intensity decoy-state method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2], allows two legiti-
mate parties, Alice and Bob, to create a random secret key
even when the channel is accessible to an eavesdropper, Eve.
Compared with classical cryptography, quantum cryptogra-
phy has the biggest advantage that its unconditionally secu-
rity is based on the fundamental laws of physics—no-cloning
theorem and uncertainty principle[3].
Since the best-known protocol–BB84[1] was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard, quantum cryptography has developed
well both theoretically and experimentally[4–11]. In the orig-
inal proposal of BB84 protocol, a single photon source is
necessary. But the single photon source is still commer-
cially unavailable with current technology. Usually people use
weak coherent pulse (WCP) source instead and many WCP-
based QKD experiments have been done since the first QKD
experiment[12]. Actually due to the multi-photon pulse, the
QKD system will suffer from photon-number splitting (PNS)
attack[13, 14]. To protect QKD from PNS attack, one can use
the so-called decoy-state method[15–19] that could closely
reach the performance of single photon sources. The method
that Alice prepares decoy state actively is also called active
decoy-state method. But in practice, because of the imperfect
experiments and channels, it may bring in some side channel
information that Eve can make use of to have an attack. In real
active (regular) decoy state experiments, it is more difficult to
verify the assumption that Eve cannot distinguish decoy and
signal states.[20]
However, passive decoy-state method[21, 22] can reduce
the side information in decoy state preparation procedure.
Different from the active decoy-state method, passive decoy-
state method only uses one intensity signal, and it passively
distinguishes decoy and signal states by Alice’s detector. Pas-
sive decoy-state method doesn’t need to change the experi-
ments that active decoy-state method has used.
Existing studies of decoy-state method always suppose that
the devices are ideal, and Alice, Bob can control their experi-
ments accurately. In fact, the conditions are difficult to satisfy,
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especially for the practical photon sources. An important im-
perfect factor of photon sources is intensity fluctuations. Due
to unavoidable interference from environments, the power of
source is constantly changing. And there should be deviation
between the true value and assumed value. When the devia-
tion rises and falls irregularly, one can call it intensity fluctua-
tion. The intensity fluctuation in experiment will result in the
irregular change of the photon number distribution, bringing
potential security threat to the practical QKD. Therefore, re-
searching on the impact of intensity fluctuation to the security
of QKD system is far important to the practical application of
QKD.
For active decoy-state method, Wang et al.[23, 24] have
studied the relationship between key generation rate and
source errors. And WCP source is regarded as a specific ex-
ample to prove the correctness of the conclusions. Wang et al.,
Zhou[25, 26] have proven that HSPS and HPCS sources are
more stable than WCP sources in the conditions of intensity
fluctuation, respectively. However, most of the above results
are all confined within the active decoy-state method. J. Z.
Hu et al.[27] have a significative study on the AYKI protocol
about the PDC source with intensity fluctuations. The WCP
source used in passive decoy-state method also exist the im-
perfection of intensity fluctuation. Therefore, how intensity
fluctuations influence the performance of passive decoy-state
method that uses WCP source remains to be studied and this
is just the motivation of this paper.
In this paper, we firstly introduce the transformed WCP
source used for passive decoy state. With the source, we de-
scribe the passive decoy-state protocol that without consid-
ering intensity fluctuations. Then we consider the passive
decoy-state method using the transformed WCP source with
intensity fluctuation. And we recalculate the final key rate
of passive decoy-state method with intensity fluctuations. By
numerical simulations, we give the results of key generation
rate with different transmission distances and different inten-
sity fluctuations. Finally we compare the passive decoy-state
method with the active decoy-state method of three-intensity
and two-intensity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
the transformed WCP source. Next in Sec. III we study the
passive decoy-state method using transformed WCP source in
2the ideal condition. Then we consider the passive decoy-state
method using transformed WCP source with intensity fluctua-
tions in Sec. IV. The numerical simulations of Sec. III and IV
are shown in Sec. V. And we also show the comparison be-
tween the passive decoy-state method with the active decoy-
state method of three-intensity and two-intensity in this Sec.
Finally, Sec. VI concludes the paper with a summary.
II. THE TRANSFORMED WCP SOURCE
Due to the characters of WCP source itself, it cannot
be used for passive decoy-state method directly. Curty et
al.[28, 29] transform WCP source to make the source output
two Fock diagonal states, so that it can be used for passive
decoy-state. The fundamental setups are shown as follows.
FIG. 1. Transformed WCP sources.
In Fig.1, ρ and σ denote the coherent states of two phase
randomized WCP source states, respectively,
ρ = e−µ1
∞∑
n=0
µn1
n!
|n〉 〈n| , (1)
σ = e−µ2
∞∑
n=0
µn2
n!
|n〉 〈n| , (2)
with µ1 and µ2 denoting the mean photon number of the two
signals, respectively. In this paper, we consider the threshold
detector as the Photon-detector in Fig.1. In this scenario, the
joint probability of having n photons in output mode a and m
photons in output mode b can be written as[28]
pn,m =
υn+me−υ
n!m!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
γn(1 − γ)mdθ, (3)
where the parameters υ, γ and ξ are given by
υ = µ1 + µ2,
γ =
µ1t+µ2(1−t)+ξ cos θ
υ
,
ξ = 2
√
µ1µ2(1 − t)t.
(4)
and t denote the transmittance of a beam splitter.
Whenever the sender, Alice, does not care the result of the
measurement in mode b, the probability of having n photons
in mode a can be written as
ptn =
∞∑
m=0
pn,m =
υn
n!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
γne−υγdθ. (5)
For the Alice’s detector, the joint probability of having n
photons in mode a and no click in the threshold detector has
now the form can be expressed as
pcn = (1 − ε)
∞∑
m=0
(1 − ηd)m pn,m
= (1 − ε) υne−ηdυ
n!
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0 γ
ne−(1−ηd)υγdθ.
(6)
where the parameter ε denotes dark count and ηd denotes the
detection efficiency of the detector.
Then the probability for having n photons in mode a and
producing a click in Alices threshold detector is
pcn = p
t
n − p
c¯
n. (7)
III. PASSIVE DECOY-STATE METHOD USING
TRANSFORMED WCP SOURCE WITHOUT INTENSITY
FLUCTUATIONS
The difference between passive decoy state and active de-
coy state is that passive decoy state need not change the inten-
sity of the laser pulses randomly to estimate the lower bound
of single-photon counts Q1 and the upper bound of quan-
tum bit error rate (QBER) of bits generated by single photon
pulses. In passive decoy state, the key point to distinguish
decoy states and signal states is click or no click of Alice’s
detector.
The common point between passive decoy state and active
decoy state is that the counting rates and the error rates of
pulse of the same photon-number states from the signal states
and the decoy states shall be equal to each other[16],
Ym = Y′m, em = e′m, (8)
where Ym and Y′m denote the counting rates of m photons from
signal states and decoy states, respectively. And em, e′m de-
note the error rates of m photons from signal states and decoy
states, respectively.
In 2005, Lo et al.[16] combined the decoy state method
with the results provided by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-
Preskill(GLLP)[30] analysis and gave the exact formula for
secure key generation rate:
R ≥
∑
l=c,c¯
max
{
Rl, 0
}
, (9)
where Rl satisfies
Rl ≥ q
{
pl0Y0 + p
l
1Y1 [1 − H2 (e1)] − Ql f
(
El
)
H2
(
El
)}
. (10)
The parameter q is the efficiency of the protocol. For
the standard BB84 protocol[1], q = 1/2. f
(
El
)
denotes
3the efficiency of the error correction protocol as a function
of the error rate El[31], typically f
(
El
)
≥ 1 with Shan-
non limit f
(
El
)
= 1(usually, we consider 1.22 as its ap-
proximate value). e1 denotes the single photon error rate.
H2 (x) = −xlog2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1 − x) is the binary Shan-
non entropy function.
For passive decoy state, it has said that one distinguishes
decoy states and signal states by click and no click of Alice’s
detector. So in this paper we define that the c denotes click of
the detector while c¯ denotes no click of the detector. And here
we denote the signals that cause a click of Alice’s detector are
signal states. The ones that cause no click of Alice’s detector
are decoy states.
Then the l in Eq.10 is l ∈ (c, c¯). And Qc , Qc¯ denote the
counting rates of Alices detector producing a click and no
click, respectively,
Qc = 1 − (1 − Y0)e−ηdwI0,ηsysξ, (11)
Qc¯ = Nw − (1 − ε)(1 − Y0)e(ηd−ηsys)w−ηdv. (12)
where Iq,z represents the modified Bessel function of the first
kind[32].
The upper bound of e1 and the lower bound of YL1 is[28, 29]
eU1 = min
{
Ec Qc−pc0YL0 e0
pc1Y
L
1
,
Ec¯ Qc¯−pc¯0YL0 e0
pc¯1Y
L
1
,
pc¯0Et Qt−pt0Ec¯ Qc¯(pt1 pc¯0−pc¯1 pt0)YL1
}
,
(13)
YL1 = max

pt2Qc¯ − pc¯2Qt −
(
pt2 p
c¯
0 − p
c¯
2 p
t
0
)
Y0
pt2 p
c¯
1 − p
c¯
2 p
t
1
, 0
 , (14)
where
Et = (e0 − ed) Y0
/
Qt + ed, (15)
Ec¯ = (e0 − ed) Y0/Nw + ed, (16)
Ec = Et − Ec¯, (17)
Nw =
∞∑
n=0
pc¯n = (1 − ε)e−ηd[µ1(1−t)+µ2t]I0,ηdξ. (18)
The final result shall be shown in Sec.V.
IV. PASSIVE DECOY-STATE METHOD USING
TRANSFORMED WCP SOURCE WITH INTENSITY
FLUCTUATIONS
Now we introduce the parameter δ that denotes the intensity
fluctuations. The fluctuation ranges of the two intensities of
the WCP states are characterized by
µ1
(
1 − δµ1
)
≤ µrea1 ≤ µ1
(
1 + δµ1
)
, (19)
µ2
(
1 − δµ2
)
≤ µrea2 ≤ µ2
(
1 + δµ2
)
, (20)
where µrea1 and µ
rea
2 are the real intensity of WCP states ρ and
σ. The range of the intensity fluctuation parameters δµ1 and
δµ2 is [0, 0.10]. When δx = 0(x = µ1, µ2), it means there are
no intensity fluctuations. When δx = 0.10(x = µ1, µ2), it sig-
nifies the maximum upper bound of the intensity fluctuation.
According to the range of µrea1 and µ
rea
2 , we can get
pLc ≤ p
rea
c ≤ p
U
c , p
L
c¯ ≤ p
rea
c¯ ≤ p
U
c¯ , (21)
where preac and preac¯ are the real probability for having n pho-
tons in mode a in the case of having a or no click in the thresh-
old detector, respectively.
Now we suppose Alice totally sends M optical pulses to
Bob. The count of Alices detector click is Nc and the count of
Alices detector no click is Nc¯. Nc and Nc¯ can be expressed as
Nc =
∞∑
m=0
nm,c = n0,c + n1,c + n2,c +
∞∑
m=3
nm,c, (22)
Nc¯ =
∞∑
m=0
nm,c¯ = n0,c¯ + n1,c¯ + n2,c¯ +
∞∑
m=3
nm,c¯, (23)
where nm,c and nm,c¯ denote counts of having m photons in
mode a when Alices detector are click and no click, respec-
tively. The formulas can also be written as
Nc = PcMQc, Nc¯ = Pc¯MQc¯, (24)
where Pc denotes the probability of Alices detector producing
a click, Pc¯ denotes the probability of Alices detector produc-
ing no click,
Pc¯ = Nw =
∞∑
n=0
pc¯n = (1 − ε)e−ηd[µ1(1−t)+µ2t]I0,ηdξ , (25)
The fraction of m-photon counts is[33]
∆m,x =
Ym,x pm,x
Qx =
nm,x
Nx
. (x = c, c¯) (26)
Our purpose is to estimate the lower bound of ∆1,c and ∆0,c
in the intensity fluctuation case.
In order to cancel nm≥2,c and nm≥2,c¯ elements in Eq.22 23,
applying Nc¯Pc¯ −
Nc
Pc , we can get
n1,c¯
Pc¯
−
n1,c
Pc
=
(
Nc¯
Pc¯
−
Nc
Pc
)
+
(
n0,c
Pc
−
n0,c¯
Pc¯
)
+
∞∑
m=2
(
nm,c
Pc
−
nm,c¯
Pc¯
)
.
(27)
And we also note that the following inequalities hold
true:[19, 34]
0 ≤ n0,c ≤
EcNc
e0
, n0,c¯ ≤
Pc¯n0,c
Pcq0
, (28)
nm,c¯ ≤
Pv pUm,v
PµpLm,µ
nm,c =
Pv
Pµ
nm,c
qm
(29)
4where qm = pLm,µ
/
pUm,v and k ≥ 0.
By substituting inequalities Eq.28 and Eq.29, the third and
forth elements in Eq.27 become
n0,c
Pc
−
n0,c¯
Pc¯
≥ −
EcNc
e0
(
1
q0
− 1
)
, (30)
nm,c
Pc
−
nm,c¯
Pc¯
≥ −
nm,c
Pc
(
1 − 1
qm
)
. (31)
And when m ≥ 1 we can get qm ≤ q1 and q2 < q0 . Finally
we obtain the lower bound of the fraction of single-photon
count for the signal source,
∆1,c =
n1,c
Nc
≥ ∆L1,c =
Qc¯ − Qc −
(
1
q0
− 1
)
Ec Nc
e0(
1
q0
− 1
)
Qc
. (32)
Then the lower bound of ∆0,c is
∆0,c =
n0,µ
Nµ
≥ ∆L0,c =
Q0 pL0,µ
Qµ . (33)
We define em,x (x = c, c¯) is the error rate of m photons state
when Alices detector produces a or no click, respectively. The
overall quantum bit error rate (QBER) is
Ex =
∞∑
m=0
em,x∆m,x, (x = c, c¯) . (34)
Since em,x ≥ 0 and ∆m,x ≥ 0 for all m ≥ 2, we can formu-
late the upper bound of the single-photon error rate of Alice’s
detector producing a click,
e1,c ≤ e
U
1,c =
Ec − e0∆L0,c
∆L1,c
=
Ec
∆L1,c
, (35)
where the error rate of dark count e0 is 0.5.
Then we can get the key rate generated by the GLLP
formula[30].
Now we shall calculate Rc¯. In Sec.III we say that counting
rates and error rates of pulse of the same photon-number states
from the signal states and the decoy states must be equal.
Ym,c = Ym,c¯, em,c = em,c¯. (36)
According to Eq.26 and Eq.32, we can get
Y l1,c¯ = Y
l
1,c =
∆l1,cQc
pu1,c
. (37)
Then, the lower bound of ∆l1,c¯ can be expressed as
∆l1,c¯ =
Y l1,c¯ p
u
1,c¯
Qc¯ . (38)
After all, the key generation rate Rc¯ is
Rc¯ ≥ qQc¯
{
∆L0,c¯ + ∆
L
1,c¯
[
1 − H2
(
eU1,c¯
)]
− f (Ec¯) H2 (Ec¯)
}
. (39)
And the final key rate generated is
R = Rc + Rc¯. (40)
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Here we will take some numerical simulations to show how
intensity fluctuation influences on final key generation rate.
In this scenario, the yields Yn can be expressed as[16, 19]
Yn = 1 − (1 − Y0)
(
1 − ηsys
)n
, (41)
where ηsys denotes the overall transmittance of the system. It
can be written as
ηsys = ηchannelηBob, (42)
where ηchannel is the transmittance of the quantum channel, and
ηBob denotes the overall transmittance of Bobs detection appa-
ratus. The parameter ηchannel can be related with a transmis-
sion distance d measured in km for the given QKD schemes
as
ηchannel = 10−
αd
10 , (43)
where α represents the loss coefficient of the channel (e.g., an
optical fiber) measured in dB/km.
Firstly, we shall describe the final key generation rate of
passive decoy state using WCP source without intensity fluc-
tuation. The experimental QKD parameters showed in Table I
come from[35].
We set as [28, 29] mentioned that µ1 is around 0.5, µ2 is
quite weak (around 10−4). Also we set ε is 3.2× 10−7. Define
R as the key generation rate of passive decoy state. Define
R(δ)/R(0) is the fidelity of passive decoy state, where R (δ)
denotes the R with intensity fluctuations and R (0) denotes the
R with no intensity fluctuations.
Now we will characterize the relationship between R and
the intensity fluctuation when transmission distance d is fixed.
The result is shown in Fig. 2.
From Fig.2, we can see that the R(δ)/R(0) of d = 30km
is larger than the one of d = 50km. And when δ is getting
to 0.1, the R(δ)/R(0) is getting to 0. It indicates that the key
generation rate R is becoming small with intensity fluctuation
becoming large.
Then Fig.3 and Fig.4 shows us the comparison of the
key rate R versus transmission distance among two-intensity,
three-intensity decoy-state method and passive decoy-state
method.
In Fig.3 and Fig.4, the R(δ)/R(0) and the extreme transmis-
sion distance of passive decoy-state method with δ = 0.02
are larger than those of δ = 0.05, obviously. We can get
that R becomes smaller with intensity fluctuation δ becoming
larger for passive decoy-state method. So is the extreme trans-
mission distance. Also, we can find that the passive decoy-
state method is better than the two-intensity active decoy-state
method and is close to the three-intensity active decoy-state
α(dB/km) ηBob ed Y0 ηd
0.21 0.045 0.033 1.7 × 10−6 0.12
TABLE I. Experimental QKD parameters
50 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
100
Intensity fluctuation δ
R
(δ)
/R
(0)
d=30km
d=50km
FIG. 2. (Color online) R versus intensity fluctuations δ.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Transmission distance(km)
R
(δ)
/R
(0)
Passive decoy−state
δ=0.02
Passive decoy−state
δ=0.05
WCP+2decoy−state
δ=0.02
WCP+2decoy−state
δ=0.05
FIG. 3. (Color online) Comparison of the R(δ)/R(0) versus transmis-
sion distance with intensity fluctuations between passive decoy-state
and WCP+2-decoy-state.
method. The R(δ)/R(0) of passive decoy-state method is al-
most equal to the one of three-intensity method with δ = 0.02.
The different point is that the extreme transmission distance
of passive decoy-state method is a little smaller than that of
the three-intensity method. We analyze the reasons as fol-
lows. Firstly, the passive decoy-state method only uses the
sets of click and no click. This may lead to reduction of key
generation efficiency but is still close to the theoretical limit.
Secondly, it has been proven that the three-intensity method
approaches the infinite decoy-state method[15]. And the pas-
sive decoy-state method can be regard as a two-intensity pas-
sive decoy-state method. So the transmission distance may
be a little smaller that the three-intensity method, the ideal
case. But considering the factors of the implementation of the
three-intensity active decoy-state scheme and the protection
from the side channel information attacks that may bring in
the possibility of distinguishing decoy and signal states, the
passive decoy-state method is better.
From the simulation results above, we can easily see that
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Transmission distance(km)
R
(δ)
/R
(0)
WCP+3decoy−state
δ=0.02
Passive decoy−state
δ=0.02
WCP+3decoy−state
δ=0.05
Passive decoy−state
δ=0.05
FIG. 4. (Color online) Comparison of the R(δ)/R(0) versus transmis-
sion distance with intensity fluctuations between passive decoy-state
and WCP+3-decoy-state.
intensity fluctuations have unignorable influence on the final
key rate of the passive decoy-state QKD protocol with WCP
source. When the transmission distance is close to its upper
bound, the influence is obvious particularly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we analyze the transformed WCP source that
can be use for passive decoy states. Using the source, we
recalculated the final key rate of passive decoy-state method
with intensity fluctuations. According to the numerical sim-
ulations, we find that the intensity fluctuations have influence
that cannot be neglected on the final key rate of the passive
decoy-state QKD method with WCP source. When the inten-
sity fluctuation parameter δ becomes large, the key genera-
tion rate and the extreme transmission distance become small.
Moreover, comparing with two-intensity, three-intensity ac-
tive decoy-state method, we can get that the passive decoy-
state is better than two-intensity active decoy-state and is close
to three-intensity active decoy-state in the case of having in-
tensity fluctuations. But when we consider the difficulty of
implementation and the side channel information which may
bring in the risk of distinguishing decoy and signal states by
Eve, passive decoy-state method is a better choice.
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